Court of Appeals Recognizes Private Constitutional Tort Remedy Against the State by Boyle, Patrick J.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 71 
Number 4 Volume 71, Fall 1997, Number 4 Article 6 
March 2012 
Court of Appeals Recognizes Private Constitutional Tort Remedy 
Against the State 
Patrick J. Boyle 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Boyle, Patrick J. (1997) "Court of Appeals Recognizes Private Constitutional Tort Remedy Against the 
State," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 71 : No. 4 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol71/iss4/6 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
NEW YORK LAW
Court of Appeals recognizes private constitutional tort remedy
against the State
In September 1992, a 77-year-old white woman was alleg-
edly attacked at knifepoint in a house in Oneonta, near the State
University campus.1 Based upon the woman's description of the
assailant as a black man who may have cut his hand during the
attack, both New York State Police and University security offi-
cials began a five-day manhunt for the perpetrator.2 They ob-
tained a computer-generated list containing the names and ad-
dresses of every African-American male attending the University
and sought to interrogate each of those students. Additionally,
both State and local law enforcement officials conducted a
"street-sweep" in which all African-Americans in the vicinity of
the City of Oneonta were stopped and similarly questioned.4
These tactics did not lead to an arrest of a suspect.5
"Suspects" who were interrogated by the police or whose
names were on the computer list, brought suit in both state and
federal court and asserted that the conduct of the police was ra-
cially motivated and therefore deprived them of rights guaran-
1 See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 911 F. Supp. 580, 583 (N.D.N.Y. 1996), order
rev'd in part, 106 F.3d 1125, 1135 (2d Cir. 1997); Brown v. State, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 176,
674 N.E.2d 1129, 1131, 652 N.Y.S.2d 223, 225 (1996).
2 See Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 176-77, 674 N.E.2d at 1131-32, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 225-
26.
3 See id. at 177, 674 N.E.2d at 1131-32, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 225-26; see also Brown,
911 F. Supp. at 584.
4 See Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 177, 674 N.E.2d at 1132, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 226; see also
Brown, 911 F. Supp. at 584.
' See Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 177, 674 N.E.2d at 1132, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
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teed by both the New York and United States Constitutions.6 In
the federal suit, the plaintiffs named as defendants the indi-
viduals who acted under color of state law7 and the municipality
of Oneonta, alleging that the policies of the Oneonta Police De-
partment led to the constitutional rights violations.8 In the state
action, plaintiffs sought damages from the State of New York,
alleging illegal and unconstitutional acts by the State, the State
Police, the State University of New York, and other individuals
acting under color of state law.9 However, an issue concerning
the State's liability arose because federal law does not allow a
state itself to be named as a defendant in such a lawsuit. °
In spite of this backdrop of state immunity from suits alleg-
ing constitutional torts-that is, actions for damages against the
government or individual defendants for violations of a constitu-
6 See Brown, 911 F. Supp. at 584 (noting that claims alleged by plaintiffs in-
cluded violations of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and were brought under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and New York State law); Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at
176, 674 N.E.2d at 1131, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 225 (noting various state and federal con-
stitutional and civil rights violations alleged by plaintiffs).
7 See Brown, 911 F. Supp. at 586-87 (granting summary judgment motion in fa-
vor of State police officers as to 24 of 27 plaintiffs alleging 42 U.S.C. § 1983 viola-
tions); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 of Title 42 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be li-
able to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Id.
, See Brown, 911 F. Supp. at 591 (setting forth reasons for which plaintiffs felt
City of Oneonta should be held liable for officers' conduct); see also Monell v. New
York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978) (distinguishing between
liability of municipality solely on basis of actions of employee, but holding munici-
pality liable under statute if policies or customs caused constitutional rights depri-
vation).
9 See Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 176, 674 N.E.2d at 1131, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
'0 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State."); see also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 63-65 (1989). In Will, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
state is a person within the meaning of section 1983. Id. at 63. The issue was placed
squarely before the Court because the section 1983 claim was proceeding in Michi-
gan state court, where the Eleventh Amendment was not an obstacle to suing the
state. See id. The Court concluded "that a state is not a person within the meaning
of § 1983." Id. at 64.
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tional right"--the New York Court of Appeals, in Brown v. State
of New York,' reversed the Appellate Division and held that
based on principles embodied in the State Constitution 13 and ju-
risdiction created by the Court of Claims Act," the State could be
held liable for damages if its employees violate a person's consti-
tutional rights. 5
Writing for the majority, Judge Simons acknowledged that
unlike federal constitutional tort actions arising under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,16 New York does not have a statute providing for a pri-
vate right of action against the State or its employees for viola-
tions of the State Constitution." Nevertheless, the majority
employed the "analytical tools" of section 874A of the Restate-
" See Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 177-78, 674 N.E.2d at 1132, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 226
(discussing definition and origination of term "constitutional torts").
12 Id. at 172, 674 N.E.2d at 1129, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
13 Id. at 186-92, 674 N.E.2d at 1137-41, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 231-35. "Manifestly, ar-
ticle I, § 12 of the State Constitution and that part of section 11 relating to equal
protection are self-executing." Id. at 186, 674 N.E.2d at 1137, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
The provisions of the New York State Constitution that were held to be self-
executing read as follows:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or
any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or
religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other
person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any
agency or subdivision of the state.
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id. § 12.
" Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 179-83, 674 N.E.2d at 1133-36, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 227-30.
The two relevant provisions-sections 8 and 9-of the Court of Claims Act, read in
concert, waive the State's sovereign immunity and impose upon the State vicarious
liability for the torts of its employees. Section 8 provides:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby
assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance
with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court
against individuals or corporations, provided the claimant complies with
the limitations of this article.
N.Y. COURT OF CLAImS ACT § 8 (McKinney 1989). Section 9 provides that "[tihe
court shall have jurisdiction ... To hear and determine a claim of any person, corpo-
ration or municipality against the state ... for the torts of its officers or employees
while acting as such officers or employees, providing the claimant complies with the
limitations of this article." Id. § 9.
Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 191, 674 N.E.2d at 1140, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
'6 See supra note 7 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
" See Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 186, 674 N.E.2d at 1137, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
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ment (Second) of Torts18 and the United States Supreme Court
decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics,9 which recognized a federal action against
federal agents, in order to imply a remedy against the State for
violations of the State Constitution.2°
The court emphasized that while a damages remedy was not
explicitly included in either the State Constitution or in subse-
quent enforcement legislation,2 there was "historical support"
for implying a tort remedy for violations of rights created by the
State Constitution." The court pointed out that the delegates
'8 See id. at 186-90, 674 N.E.2d at 1138-40, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 232-34; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A (1979). Section 874A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts 874A states:
Tort Liability for Violation of Legislative Provision.
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing
or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the
violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropri-
ate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to as-
sure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of
the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new
cause of action analogous to an existing tort action.
Id.
In Brown, the Court of Appeals began its analysis by noting that State courts
have implied causes of action for damages through the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 874A. Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 186, 674 N.E.2d at 1138, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
19 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized a private fed-
eral right of action for damages against federal agents who conducted an unreason-
able search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 388-98. Justice Harlan
stated:
The contention that the federal courts are powerless to accord a litigant
damages for a claimed invasion of his federal constitutional rights until
Congress explicitly authorizes the remedy cannot rest on the notion that
the decision to grant compensatory relief involves a resolution of policy
considerations not susceptible of judicial discernment.
Id. at 402 (Harlan, J., concurring).
20 See Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 187-90, 674 N.E.2d at 1138-40, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 232-
34. From the Bivens decision, the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged the
principles that "constitutional guarantees are worthy of protection on their own
terms without being linked to some common-law or statutory tort, and that the
courts have the obligation to enforce these rights by ensuring that each individual
receives an adequate remedy for violation of a constitutional duty." Id. at 187, 674
N.E.2d at 1138, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
21 See id. at 186-87, 674 N.E.2d at 1137-38, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 231-32.
22 See id. at 189, 674 N.E.2d at 1139, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 233 (citing People v. De-
fore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926)). In Defore, Judge Cardozo wrote the opinion
for the Court of Appeals, holding that evidence obtained in violation of the search
and seizure clause of the Civil Rights Act could be used against the defendant in a
criminal trial. Defore, 242 N.Y. at 21-22, 150 N.E. at 588-89. Judge Cardozo believed
that the defendant's remedy for the wrong was a civil suit for damages. See id. at
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from the State's 1938 Constitutional Convention did not reject or
disfavor a damages remedy for violations of "constitutional
torts."' Whether or not the Convention delegates favored a con-
stitutional tort remedy or believed such a remedy to exist at
common law is immaterial, for it was precisely those delegates
who failed to grant a private remedy in the Constitution and in-
stead granted to the legislature all subsequent authority to cre-
ate claims against the State. In fact, the legislature has never
enacted a statute that creates such a remedy.'
In essence, the court engendered the potential for liability of
the State by recognizing that constitutional torts are included
within the "torts" for which the Court of Claims Act imposes re-
spondeat superior liability upon the State.' In so doing, the
court disregarded its own prior ruling that State liability should
not be imposed under the Court of Claims Act absent legislative
language "clearly designed to have that effect." 6 Furthermore,
the State's vicarious liability created by the court sharply con-
tradicts federal law that precludes states and municipalities
from being held liable for the constitutional torts of their em-
ployees.27
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Bellacosa presented a more per-
suasive analysis than was set forth by the majority.28 He urged
that the torts for which the State is vicariously liable should not
19, 150 N.E. at 587. The majority in Brown concluded therefore, that the reason the
New York Constitution did not contain a damage remedy was because the delegates
to the Constitutional Convention assumed that such a remedy already existed.
Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 189, 674 N.E.2d at 1139, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 233 (citing 1 REVISED
RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 416,
425, 459 (1938)) [hereinafter REVISED RECORD].
' Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 189, 674 N.E.2d at 1139, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 233 (stating
that debates from 1938 State Constitutional Convention "reveal[ed] that the concept
of damages for constitutional violations was neither foreign to the delegates nor re-
jected by them").
24 See id. at 186, 674 N.E.2d at 1137, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 231; see also supra text
accompanying note 17.
5 See id. at 183, 674 N.E.2d at 1136, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
26 Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 55, 64 N.E.2d 704, 706 (1945) (Thacher,
J.).
27 See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95
(1978) (emphasizing that municipality must have caused deprivation of rights in or-
der for it to incur liability). "[lit is when execution of a government's policy or cus-
tom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity
is responsible under § 1983." Id. at 694.
2' See Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 197-213, 674 N.E.2d at 1144-54, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 238-
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include "constitutional torts."29 Judge Bellacosa noted that while
the term "constitutional torts" is "catchy nomenclature for law
review titles,"" the nature of such torts is different from the
common law torts referred to in the Court of Claims Act.31
Moreover, not only can constitutional torts be distinguished
analytically from common law torts,32 but they also do not fall
within the ambit of claims intended by the drafters of the Court
of Claims Act when they surrendered sovereign immunity for
"torts" in 1939.33
29 Id. at 197-213, 674 N.E.2d at 1144-54, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 238-48.
3' Id. at 204, 674 N.E.2d at 1148, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
' See id. at 197-210, 674 N.E.2d at 1144-53, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 238-47.
31 Judge Bellacosa pointed out that the term "constitutional tort" was first
coined in the title of a law review article that attempted to " 'analyze the jurispru-
dential development of a federal statutory remedy.' "Id. at 204, 674 N.E.2d at 1148,
652 N.Y.S.2d at 242 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional
Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 277, 323-24
(1965)). Professor Shapo himself recognized the dilemma in describing a
"constitutional tort" because of the inability to exclusively characterize a
"constitutional tort" as a part of constitutional law or as an element of a private tort.
See Shapo, supra, at 324. This stems from the fact that such torts are a combination
of tort elements with a constitutionally-based test. See id. As a result, this confusing
dichotomy makes it difficult to determine the situations in -which the remedy would
apply. See id.
The Supreme Court has distinguished common law torts from constitutional
torts in an effort to prevent common law torts from "sneak[ing]" into federal court.
William Burnham, Separating Constitutional and Common-Law Torts: A Critique
and a Proposed Constitutional Theory of Duty, 73 MINN. L. REV. 515, 516 (1989)
(presenting in-depth discussion of federal courts' attempts to distinguish between
common law and constitutional torts). Ironically, Brown presented the reverse
situation to the Court of Appeals, where a clear constitutional claim sought a home
within the New York State common law tort regime for the purpose of fitting within
the terms of the Court of Claims Act. Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New York
Court of Appeals has noted, however, that unlike federal courts, "state courts move
seamlessly between the common law and state constitutional law, the shifting
ground at times barely perceptible." Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a
New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 15 (1995).
Judge Bellacosa believed that the majority in Brown elevated "semantical
shorthand" over the "substance and essence" of the claim. Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 204,
674 N.E.2d at 1148, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 242 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). This was con-
trary to a long-standing rule in New York that courts should look to the true nature
of the action and not merely to its name. See Morrison v. National Broad. Co., 19
N.Y.2d 453, 459, 227 N.E.2d 572, 574, 280 N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 (1967) (citing Brick v.
Cohn-Hall-Marx Co., 276 N.Y. 259, 264, 11 N.E.2d 902, 904 (1937)).
"The word "tort" in the Court of Claims Act, while not "frozen like a fossil in
time" should be interpreted as it was understood by the enactors of the Act itself.
Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 201, 674 N.E.2d at 1146, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 240 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting). See generally Jill A. Abramow, Survey of New York Practice, 58 ST.
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Judge Bellacosa also argued that the majority erred in im-
plying a remedy against the State where none exists.34 The State
Constitution itself gives the State legislature the sole authority
to determine the types of monetary claims that may be brought
against the State.35 Judge Bellacosa thereby urged that if any
legislative history was at all relevant, the meaning of the term
"torts" within the Court of Claims Act was most important.8
The legislative history, the dissent noted, displayed "no inten-
tion, understanding or contemplation to sweep the State's as-
sumption of liability into [the] uncharted and open waters" of
constitutional torts.3 ' Therefore, no room remained for the ma-
jority's implication of a remedy based on the Restatement, a Su-
preme Court opinion, and its interpretation of the Constitutional
JOHN'S L. REV. 199, 200 & n.66 (1983) (describing evolution from old rule of sover-
eign's absolute immunity from tort liability to current legislative waiver of sovereign
immunity).
:" The dissent attacked the majority's assertion that the delegates to the Consti-
tutional Convention, based on Judge Cardozo's opinion in Defore, believed there al-
ready existed a remedy against the State. See Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 208-09, 674
N.E.2d at 1151-52, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 244-45 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). On the con-
trary, Judge Cardozo's dictum about a private right of action was only concerned
with a remedy against the offending officer, and not with a claim against the State.
See id. at 208, 674 N.E.2d at 1151, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 244-45. Moreover, the delegates
to the 1938 Constitutional Convention were acutely aware of this limitation. See id.
at 208-09, 674 N.E.2d at 1151, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 245 (citing REVISED RECORD, supra
note 22, at 416) ("The State forbids an unreasonable search. The State officer diso-
beys the injunction. He can and should be punished and made to answer in dam-
ages.") (Statement of Harold Riegelman).
The same Constitutional Convention, relied upon now to infer a direct ac-
tion damage remedy against the State, expressly rejected-after sharp and
lively debate-not only an exclusionary remedy, but also a forfeiture of of-
fice remedy. These express rejections were not done because of the hypo-
thetical dictum of Judge Cardozo concerning a personal civil action, but for
fundamental, doctrinal and jurisprudential reasons that were fully de-
bated.
Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 208-09, 674 N.E.2d at 1151, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 245 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting) (citing REVISED RECORD, supra note 22, at 577-78). "The gap between
express rejection of considered remedies and the discovery of this new additional
one is not bridgeable by statutory construction." Id. at 209, 674 N.E.2d at 1151, 652
N.Y.S.2d at 245 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
'5 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 9. "The court [of claims] shall have jurisdiction to hear
and determine claims against the state or by the state against the claimant or be-
tween conflicting claimants as the legislature may provide." Id.
:' See Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 200-03, 674 N.E.2d at 1146-48, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 240-
42 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
37 See id. at 200, 674 N.E.2d at 1146, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 240 (citing Bill Jacket, L.
1939, ch. 860, Mem. of James Barrett, Presiding Judge of the Ct. Cl., at 2; Mem. of
Senator Feinberg, at 2-3).
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Convention's legislative history."8
Questioning the majority on policy and analytical grounds as
well, Judge Bellacosa aptly noted that even the Supreme Court,
by stating that "[wle leave it to Congress to weigh the implica-
tions of such a significant expansion of Government liability,"39
has limited Bivens actions to suits against individuals and has
refused to allow an action against the government itself.
40
Moreover, the Supreme Court deferred to Congress to provide
the specific constitutional tort remedy against the government
and did not look to the "tort" language of the Federal Tort
Claims Act as supplying that remedy.
41
38 See id. at 210-13, 674 N.E.2d at 1152-54, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 246-48. "The cause
of action that the majority concedes it needs to 'imply' in order to give it life-
because it surely is not legislatively expressed-should not prevail over an explicit
constitutional imperative and specifically delegated authorization to the Legisla-
ture." Id. at 212-13, 674 N.E.2d at 1153, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
39 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994).
'0 The majority in Brown addressed the fact that the Supreme Court in Meyer
had limited Bivens to suits against individuals, and not the government itself.
Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 195, 674 N.E.2d at 1143, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 237. Judge Simons
attempted to dismiss these limitations on the Bivens decision on two grounds. First,
unlike federal law, the Court of Claims Act provides for State respondeat superior
liability for the torts of its employees. Second, Supreme Court restraint in the area
of constitutional torts is caused by concerns of federalism, a desire to not "unduly
interfere with States' rights." Id. at 195, 674 N.E.2d at 1143, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
Neither of these points, however, proves particularly persuasive. First, the State's
waiver of sovereign immunity under the Court of Claims Act is not greater than the
federal government's own waiver under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See infra note
41 and accompanying text (comparing waiver language of both Federal Tort Claims
Act and New York's Court of Claims Act and struggling to discern distinction). Sec-
ond, concerns of federalism could not have played a part in Meyer because that case
involved an extension of the federal cause of action recognized in Bivens to proceed
against the federal government. The distinction between Meyer and Brown is es-
sentially the philosophical differences between the New York Court of Appeals and
the United States Supreme Court concerning the sanctity of sovereign immunity.
"' Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994) ("The United States shall be liable, respect-
ing the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances ...."), and 28 U.S.C. §
2675 (1994) (describing prerequisites for suit against the government "for injury or
loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of Government while acting within the scope of his of-
fice or employment ...."), with N.Y. COURT OF CLAIMS ACT § 8 (McKinney 1989)
("The State hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby as-
sumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the
same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or
corporations ...."), and N.Y. COURT OF CLAIMS ACT § 9 (McKinney 1989) ("The court
shall have jurisdiction ... 2. To hear and determine a claim of any person, corpora-
tion or municipality against the state ... for the torts of its officers or employees
while acting as such officers or employees, providing the claimant complies with the
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Even absent the State's constitutional prohibition against
implying new remedies against the State, the majority ignored a
governing principle that significant new policy decisions should
be left to the legislature.42 Departure from that canon was par-
ticularly ill-advised, Judge Bellacosa noted, given the long line of
New York Court of Appeals decisions holding that the State's
waiver of sovereign immunity should be narrowly construed.'
Finally, the dissent noted that further proof that a private dam-
ages remedy was never intended to emanate from the New York
State Constitution, which is enforceable through the Court of
Claims Act, is that many State statutes, such as the Civil Rights
Laws, are now rendered superfluous."
limitations of this article.").
42 See, e.g., Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 633, 609 N.E.2d 105, 107, 593
N.Y.S.2d 752, 754 (1992) (refusing to recognize tort of wrongful discharge because
"'such a significant change in our law is best left to the Legislature'") (quoting
Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 301, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232, 235 (1983)).
See Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 201-02, 674 N.E.2d at 1147, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 241
(Bellacosa, J. dissenting); see also Arteaga v. State, 72 N.Y.2d 212, 215-16, 527
N.E.2d 1194, 1195-96, 532 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58-59 (1988) (holding that under Court of
Claims Act, State retains its immunity for exercise of discretionary functions);
Tarter v. State, 68 N.Y.2d 511, 518-19, 503 N.E.2d 84, 87, 510 N.Y.S.2d 528, 531
(1986) (holding that parole board enjoys immunity because its decisions involve
quasi-judicial expertise and judgment); Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 56 N.Y.2d 332,
336, 437 N.E.2d 1104, 1106, 452 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349 (1982) (citations omitted) ("[A]
statute in derogation of the sovereignty of a State must be strictly construed, waiver
of immunity by inference being disfavored .... "); Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y.
51, 55-56, 64 N.E.2d 704, 706 (1945) (holding that liability under Court of Claims
Act should not be imposed absent clear legislative direction); Goldstein v. State, 281
N.Y. 396, 405, 24 N.E.2d 97, 101 (1939) (reversing Court of Claims' decision limiting
term "officers" in Court of Claims Act, and holding that Act "must be given a rea-
sonable construction, consistent with our conception of governmental functions and
public policy"); see also John J. McNamara, Jr., The Court of Claims: Its Develop-
ment and Present Role in the Unified Court System, 40 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 23
(1965) ("[Sltatutes in derogation of the sovereignty of the state are strictly con-
strued and do not divest the state of its rights or interests, save by specific provision
or unmistakable legislative intent to that effect.").
4See Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 211-12, 674 N.E.2d at 1153, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 247
(citing Civil Rights Law § 40-c and Executive Law § 290). Section 40-c of the Civil
Rights Law prohibits civil rights discrimination and section 40-d provides both civil
and criminal penalties for violations of those rights. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 40-c,
40-d (McKinney 1992). Section 290 of the Executive Law, known as the "Human
Rights Law," see N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290(1) (McKinney 1992), creates a division in the
executive department to ensure equal opportunity and to "eliminate and prevent
discrimination." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290(3) (McKinney 1992).
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CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals has cast away the State's sovereign
immunity for the constitutional torts of its employees. By imply-
ing a private damages remedy against the State for violations of
the Constitution by quilting together the word "torts" from the
Court of Claims Act, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Consti-
tutional Convention history, and misapplied Supreme Court
analysis, the Court of Appeals has reached new heights in judi-
cial legislating. Critics often complain that courts usurp the
legislative prerogative. Rarely do courts, however, fashion new
rules of law in derogation of their own Constitution while at-
tempting to create new remedies for its very enforcement. The
Court of Appeals, however, has accomplished just that in its de-
cision in Brown v. State of New York.
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